Why did Richard Nixon so strongly endorse nuclear energy in April 1973?
On April 18, 1973, President Richard Nixon gave a special message to the congress of the United States on energy policy. Unlike more recent offerings by presidents regarding energy, that document placed a huge emphasis on making regulatory and legislative changes that would enable the rapid expansion of nuclear power; the ‘N’ word appears in the document 30 times! It contains a section titled Nuclear Energy that is nearly 800 words long and begins with the following paragraph.
Although our greatest dependence for energy until now has been on fossil fuels such as coal and oil, we must not and we need not continue this heavy reliance in the future. The major alternative to fossil fuel energy for the remainder of this century is nuclear energy.
Those are some strong words coming from a man who held one of the most powerful offices in the world.
As the title of this thought piece suggests, it is worth a few minutes to attempt to understand why President Nixon, whose support for the development of nuclear energy had been tepid, chose this moment to offer one of the most expansionary plans for nuclear power that had ever been proposed.
For historical context, it is important to recall that the dramatic oil price rise associated with the Arab Oil Embargo did not begin until October of 1973, so this policy document could not have been a reaction to that major upset in the world’s energy supply landscape. It is also important to recall that President Nixon had recently begun his second term in office after winning the November 1972 election in what was described as “a landslide victory rivaling the greatest of American political history.”
However, in the interval between November 1, 1972 and April 17, 1973, the word “Watergate” had appeared in the New York Times 477 times. In the week prior to April 18, 1973, there were at least a half a dozen articles discussing Nixon’s rapidly falling approval ratings, the prospect that presidential aids might be called to testify to Congress, the desire from Republican party leaders for him to do something, anything, to get Watergate off of the front page and a brief article describing Nixon’s speech at the Annual Correspondents’ Dinner that included the fact that Woodward and Bernstein had received an award at that dinner for their investigative reporting about Watergate.
There was also a major op-ed about Congressional consternation over testimony from the Attorney General asserting Nixon’s authority to hide almost any kind of information from Congress under the ill-defined concept of executive privilege.
Though still registering overall approval ratings above 50%, Nixon had already used up most of the goodwill generated by “ending” the Vietnam War with a unilateral withdrawal. He was well on his way to becoming the only president removed from office by the threat of impeachment. Though some of the dislike was coming from his own party, he was truly hated by many on the political left.
While it is possible to believe that Nixon’s special message to Congress about energy policy was an attempt to distract the politicians and the public from their focus on Watergate, there is another interpretation that might be more easily believed by those who remember that President Nixon’s nickname among opponents was “Tricky Dicky.” He was an enormously clever man who often seemed to be playing politics as a multilevel chess game employing complex stratagems that only he could fully understand.
His administration also included several players, including James R. Schlesinger and Henry Kissinger, who have continued to influence U.S. geopolitics in ways that have greatly benefitted the multinational petroleum industry and the investment banks headquartered in New York and London that provide the financing for its enormous projects.
It is well within the realm of possibility that the Nixon Administration’s decision to strongly support a new nuclear energy plan in April 1973 was a clever ruse aimed at harpooning nuclear energy’s public image. That sabotaging effort seems to have been needed as part of a multi-stage plan to enable a dramatic shift in the world’s economic balance of wealth and power from consumers to fossil fuel energy producers.
Since the Atoms for Peace program had been announced, numerous well-informed critics had pointed out that nuclear power plants had difficulty economically competing against plants burning fossil fuels. That was true — at least until 1971 when world crude oil prices were kept close to $2.00 per barrel by tacit agreement among the Seven Sisters [Esso (Exxon), Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, Chevron, Texaco, Gulf Oil, Mobil] with coal and natural gas prices in a similar competitive range.
Notice that the roster of dominant world oil companies included five companies headquartered in the U.S. and two headquartered in the U.K.
In 1971, the Tehran-Tripoli agreement opened the floodgates for oil exporting nations to begin nationalizing oil resources and begin demanding a different pricing structure for their increasingly valuable crude oil. The “nuclear option” became increasingly competitive as completed plants entered commercial operation and fossil fuel prices started climbing rapidly.
Key members of the Nixon Administration had devised a plan to retain American and British dominance of the multinational energy industry. It involved recycling an increasing flow of petrodollars into consumer products, defense systems and development construction contracts with lubricating finance provided by Wall Street investment banks.
In order for their strategy to succeed, they needed to do something to slow the growing financial logic of a shift away from fossil fuels to nuclear energy.
At the time, fuel oil still held a 15-20% share of the U.S. electricity market, with significant higher penetration in certain regional markets like Florida, the Upper Midwest and the Northeast. In France, Sweden, Taiwan and Japan, oil was a major source of fuel for electricity generation. Unlike today, when the shift from oil to nuclear in electricity is virtually complete, it had barely begun by 1973. If nuclear plant construction had continued at the pace established by early 1973, both natural gas and coal would also have been essentially pushed out of the electrical power market by 2000.
It may seem that I am arguing against myself here. If Nixon and his staff had wanted to discourage nuclear energy, why would they prepare a special message to Congress that was so strongly in favor of increasing our reliance on it?
In his classic 1928 work titled Propaganda, Edward Bernays included a chapter titled The New Propagandists that describes what was then a relatively new profession, that of the public relations counsel. Bernays described how the skilled practitioners of this trade helped to move public opinion by behind the scenes suggestions to influential trend setters, politicians, and product endorsers. A key concept was the proper selection and protection of image and the difficulty of maintaining the right image.
Consider this propaganda truism — establishing and maintaining a product image often involves the careful selection of credible, likable endorsers. If a public relations specialist wants to sabotage instead of promoting a product, he might do just the opposite. He could encourage strong endorsements from someone that is distrusted, disliked, and recognized as ignorant about a technical topic.
Because of the early decisions about protecting atomic energy knowledge from wide exposure as embodied by the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, nuclear energy was already considered to be shrouded in secrecy. By 1973, opponents had been raising questions about coverups and deceptive practices associated with atomic energy for a couple of decades already.
It’s not hard to imagine that skilled public relations people in the Administration clearly understood the expected effect of a tighter linkage between nuclear energy development and a president who was becoming increasingly famous as a master of coverups.
This might also help explain the surprising reversal in attitudes about nuclear energy on the Left from strong support during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to strong opposition by the Carter Administration.
PS – Here is a copy of the Nuclear Energy section of President Nixon’s special message to Congress of April 18, 1973.
NUCLEAR ENERGY
Although our greatest dependence for energy until now has been on fossil fuels such as coal and oil, we must not and we need not continue this heavy reliance in the future. The major alternative to fossil fuel energy for the remainder of this century is nuclear energy.
Our well-established nuclear technology already represents an indispensable source of energy for meeting present needs. At present there are 30 nuclear power plants in operation in the United States; of the new electrical generator capacity contracted for during 1972, 70 percent will be nuclear powered. By 1980, the amount of electricity generated by nuclear reactors will be equivalent to 1.25 billion barrels of oil, or 8 trillion cubic feet of gas. It is estimated that nuclear power will provide more than one-quarter of this country’s electrical production by 1985, and over half by the year 2000.
Most nuclear power plants now in operation utilize light water reactors. In the near future, some will use high temperature gas-cooled reactors. These techniques will be supplemented during the next decade by the fast breeder reactor, which will bring about a 30-fold increase in the efficiency with which we utilize our domestic uranium resources. At present, development of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor is our highest priority target for nuclear research and development.
Nuclear power generation has an extraordinary safety record. There has never been a nuclear-related fatality in our civilian atomic energy program. We intend to maintain that record by increasing research and development in reactor safety.
The process of determining the safety and environmental acceptability of nuclear power plants is more vigorous and more open to public participation than for any comparable industrial enterprise. Every effort must be made by the Government and industry to protect public health and safety and to provide satisfactory answers to those with honest concerns about this source of power.
At the same time, we must seek to avoid unreasonable delays in developing nuclear power. They serve only to impose unnecessary costs and aggravate our energy shortages. It is discouraging to know that nuclear facilities capable of generating 57,000 megawatts of electric power which were expected to be operational by 1972 were not completed. To replace that generating capacity we would have to use the equivalent of one-third of the natural gas the country used for generating electricity in 1972. This situation must not continue. In my first Energy Special Message in 1971, I proposed that utilities prepare and publish long-range plans for the siting of nuclear power plants and transmission lines. This legislation would provide a Federal-State framework for licensing individual plants on the basis of a full and balanced consideration of both environmental and energy needs. The Congress has not acted on that proposal. I am resubmitting that legislation this year with a number of new provisions to simplify licensing, including one to require that the Government act on all completed license applications within 18 months after they are received.
I would also emphasize that the private sector’s role in future nuclear development must continue to grow. The Atomic Energy Commission is presently taking steps to provide greater amounts of enriched uranium fuel for the Nation’s nuclear power plants. However, this expansion will not fully meet our needs in the 1980’s; the Government now looks to private industry to provide the additional capacity that will be required.
Our nuclear technology is a national asset of inestimable value. It is essential that we press forward with its development.
The increasing occurrence of unnecessary delays in the development of energy facilities must be ended if we are to meet our energy needs. To be sure, reasonable safeguards must be vigorously maintained for protection of the public and of our environment. Full public participation and questioning must also be allowed as we decide where new energy facilities are to be built. We need to streamline our governmental procedures for licensing and inspections, reduce overlapping jurisdictions and eliminate confusion generated by the government.
To achieve these ends I am taking several steps. During the coming year we will examine various possibilities to assure that all public and private interests are impartially and expeditiously weighed in all government proceedings for permits, licensing and inspections.
I am again proposing siting legislation to the Congress for electric facilities and for the first time, for deepwater ports. All of my new siting legislation includes provision for simplified licensing at both Federal and State levels. It is vital that the Congress take prompt and favorable action on these proposals.
Update: (Posted Sep 23, 2015 at 0400) The above article has been updated to make it more clear that the decision to strongly push nuclear energy in April 1973 was made by an Administration that included James R. Schlesinger and Henry Kissinger. It was not made solely by a single distracted man serving as the President.
It’s an interesting hypothesis, to be sure, but I don’t know how much weight I can put on it.
An interesting datum is the official US Government report on fast breeder reactors from the same period, which I encountered at a used-bookstore one day but didn’t buy (so I can’t cite it properly). The executive summary more or less said “because oil will remain at 1972 prices forever, & because fusion will be here within 10 years, therefore FBRs are not economically attractive”. This was so absurd to me that I nearly threw the volume across the room.
An Occam’s razor answer would be because he believed in it. Why do you say his previous support had been tepid? Some documentation? I wouldn’t say a lack of constant prior endorsement meant tepid. The administration may have thought all was well with nuke development, no need to harp on a non-problem.
He was a key member of the Eisenhower administration; was he known to not support Atoms for Peace? I’m guessing he supported it.
If there was a “tricky” policy weasel in that administration it was Henry K, and he could certainly foresee the potential for oil exporters to damage the oil based economy. But that would push a pro nuke agenda.
That speech is an extremely well written snap shot of the state of things at that time, and what needed to change, as well as a status on new development. It’s hard for me to believe it was a reverse psychology ploy based on it will be rejected because “they don’t like me.” Now if a bunch of pro nuke folks were also on his “enemies” list, I might reconsider.
I agree with mjd that President Nixon may have genuinely believed in nuclear power.
With the Watergate scandal brewing, perhaps Nixon felt there was nothing to lose, and so decided to push what he thought was best for the nation’s energy security.
It doesn’t seem reasonable to me that Nixon would leverage falling status to meet an alternate goal. It seems He, and anyone would focus on rescuing their status rather than leveraging it for an alternate purpose.
I thought his nickname was “Tricky Dick.”
He had a fondness for football analogies, so he probably would have described his politics as a kind of football game. However, his real talent was for poker, not chess or football. We used the winnings from playing poker while he was in the US Navy during WWII to fund his first campaign for Congress.
Nixon’s support for nuclear power was real,
although not always for the best of motives.
Kirk Sorensen had unearthed portions of the Watergate tapes
where Nixon is explaining to a CA congressman in his unique ellipsistic syntax
that he is going to throw full support behind the fast breeder program
and wants to spend most of the money in California
to employ defense workers that were losing their jobs after Viet Nam.
Nixon correctly feared that California would switch from a red state
to a blue state and this was his effort to avoid this. Nixon instructs
the Congressman not to make this public.
@Jack Devanney
As you pointed out, Nixon was interested in using certain nuclear projects to gain political points. That does not translate into real support for enabling nuclear energy to flourish and continue the natural progression of taking market share from fossil fuel.
Nixon came into office with a plan to reorganize the AEC and to limit the political power of the JCAE. He installed James R. Schlesinger as an AEC commissioner and then made him chairman of the Commission. He pushed forward the executive agency reorganization that resulted in the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the drifting Energy Resources and Development Agency. His Administration pushed forward a bill that became law to provide the first major federal investment in alternative energy ($20 billion!), but it was specifically limited to “non-nuclear” fossil fuel alternatives, ostensibly because nuclear energy had already received “more than its share” of encouragement.
Rod, read chapter 10 of Glenn Seaborg’s book about his service at AEC Chairman under Nixon. He explains how Nixon’s support of the breeder was a trade for Chet Holifield’s political support of a massive government reorganization that Nixon wanted to push through. He also explains how Holifield essentially offered to leave politics if Nixon would go forward with the fast breeder.
Here is the link to Kirk’s Google Tech Talk, which includes some excellent archive audio and video footage of Nixon promoting the breeder reactor in 1971.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bbyr7jZOllI
The part relating to Nixon begins at the 11:40 mark.
This article flies in the face off numerous documents, tapes, and transcripts that show Richard Nixon was strong supporter of nuclear power, particularly the breeder reactor, from the early days of his administration. See, for instance, his energy speech of June 4, 1971 (noted in an earlier comment). The facts are that on the way to this announcement, he devoted almost a whole cabinet meeting to the breeder reactor and after his speech berated his staff that it did not place even more emphasis on nuclear power. Also, he groused to staff in 1971 (on tape) that Seaborg wasn’t pushing hard enough on fusion.
@Jay Hakes
Nixon was only in favor of breeder reactor contracts for his California supporters. He was not interested in actually completing and operating the device to produce reliable electricity and prove the viability of used fuel recycling. Suggesting that the AEC push harder on fusion is another plug for his California supporters like General Atomics, which has been getting fusion research contracts since the late 1960s with not a single kilowatt hour to show for it.
Nixon and the Shah of Iran had a thing going on.
Some pieces of the puzzle may be in the book, The Oil Kings by Andrew Cooper [2012]. Nixon (actually, Kissinger by proxy) was making a major play in the Middle East where Iran would become ‘the’ pivotal US ally, the position Saudi Arabia holds today. There were contingency plans where Iran (actually, the US by proxy) would invade Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to help ‘stabilize’ the vassal-like state in which our oil companies most desired them to remain. In the case of Iran it would be a more equal partnership.
This involved not just militarizing Iran but a lot of technology transfer. The Shah did intend for his space age feudal system to modernize on his own terms, quickly, and he was playing us too. When he announced in 1974 a plan to construct 23 reactors by the year 2000 he said, “Petroleum is a noble material, much too valuable to burn … We envision producing, as soon as possible, 23,000 megawatts of electricity using nuclear plants.” Such a simple and insightful statement. I believe the Shah’s push for a nuclear grid was essentially a statement of infrastructure building and manifest destiny, nuclear power being just one country-building ‘railroad’ of the Atomic Age.
And not some transparent direct grab for nuclear weapons, as would be insinuated today. Modern journalists are such pussies. When they write about Iran now it’s like, but we have always been at war with Eastasia. They cannot seem to place themselves in the very different context of those years. When we thought Kissinger was our ally. That was a joke, I think.
I touch on the Shah as poster-boy for nuclear in this mini essay on the origins of nuke fear.
Locus…..
Interesting essay. Thanks for offering it.
@HocustLocus
I like your essay. It provides an interesting perspective that might be improved if you added a few pieces of information.
One of Ehrlich’s biggest supporters for ZPG was John D. Rockefeller III.
The Arab Oil embargo in 1973 wasn’t a complete shock to the oil companies. The same tactic was attempted during the 1967 war when Israel captured a substantial piece of territory from neighboring nations after launching successful preemptive attacks.
The attempted embargo failed at that time for two reasons – the US had not yet reached the accurately predicted Hubbert’s peak of 1970 so we were able to ramp up domestic production. The Shah of Iran, one of our good friends at the time, took the opportunity to both help the US and to capture a larger share of the oil market.
I believe Iranian production nearly doubled over the course of a single year in response to the attempted embargo by what was at the time called OAPEC – Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. When Iran and Venezuela joined, the A was removed from the acronym.
Between 1967 and 1973, there was a huge shift among petroleum rich nations to nationalize their natural resources. That came to a head in 1971 with the Tehran-Tripoli agreement. The oil company executives and government schemers like Kissinger had two years to figure out how to turn a huge — planned — price increase into a benefit for them and their friends. (See: A Century of War, Chapter 9 “Running the World Economy in Reverse: Who Made the 1970s Oil Shocks?”)
Note: I modified my original comment to correct the historical reference to the 1967 Middle East War based on commenter feedback and a review of additional sources. Mea culpa for the misinformation.
As I mentioned in my first comment above, if there was any “schemer” in the Nixon Administration it was Henry K. And we are still paying the price for a lot of it. I doubt for a minute it actually caught the US government by surprise. K would have said “We’ll survive it, who will it hurt the most, so lets encourage it.”
@mjd
I’d add Schlesinger to the list of Nixon Administration schemers.
“The same tactic was attempted during the 1967 war when Israel captured a substantial piece of territory from the aggressor nations.”
Are you confused with the 1973 Arab-Israeli War? In 1967, it was Israel that initiated hostilities resulting in the capture of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights in Syria and East Jerusalem.
With a little effort left over for the USS Liberty.
Uh oh, Fermi. Don’t confuse them with facts. It automatically brands you as an anti-semite.
I have found Rod to be very even-handed on middle eastern affairs. I think he made an honest mistake.
I believe that Rod is familiar with F. William Engdahl’s “A Century of War”. In that book, Engdahl provides an excerpt from the 1973 Bilderberg meeting held in early 1973 which alluded to a potential Arab oil embargo. It was not a surprise.
@FermiAged
Thank you for the correction. I have modified my original comment and included a note apologizing for the original error.