Accelerating Nuclear Using The Bully Pulpit

Part 2 – Changing Culture and Reducing Uncertainty

President Trump signed five Executive Orders on May 23 that are designed to accelerate the process of unleashing nuclear energy’s incredible potential. Those orders build on strong and growing public support as well as recently enacted, strongly bipartisan laws that have made it abundantly clear that America both needs and wants the affordable, reliable, abundant and clean energy that nuclear fission has proven it can produce.

Aside: Four of the five EOs that President Trump signed on May 23 include the word “nuclear”, but the fifth one “Restoring Gold Standard Science” is also destined to have a significant effect on nuclear energy development. It includes directives that will help dislodge the entrenched policy position of the “conservative” assumption that all radiation is harmful enough to justify extreme costs in efforts to reduce exposure to the absolute minimum. End Aside.

During the past 20 years, lawmakers and presidents from both parties have expressed their desire to enable nuclear energy to flourish. Unsurprisingly, they have been rewarded by voters who often express wonder that we haven’t already built a lot more nuclear plants. 

In part 1 of this series of articles on the impacts of the Executive Orders, we discussed the potential impact of the collection on addressing the waste issue that has been constraining nuclear energy growth since the mid 1970s. 

Part 2 will focus on the potential for the EOs to achieve their stated goal of 400 GW of nuclear energy capacity by 2025.

Can the U.S. Quadruple Nuclear Production by 2050?

As many others have written, there should be no expectation that executive action alone can achieve the aggressive goal of quadrupling U.S. nuclear energy production in the next 25 years. But combined with a number of other legislative and private sector actions, the Executive Orders add strong Executive Branch support and smooth the path to an achievable goal. It’s an accomplishment that has been done before.

Focusing on the US and using data from the Energy Information Agency (EIA), nuclear energy production grew from 22 TWh in 1970 to 673 in 1995. That’s a factor of 30 during a 25 year period. It. During a slightly earlier 25-year period U.S. nuclear generation increased by more than 150 times, rising from 3.7 TWh in 1965 to 577 TWh in 1990.

For the world, nuclear energy production increased by a factor of 29 between 1970 and 1995. According to Our World In Data’s Nuclear Energy page, total nuclear electricity production was 79 TWh in 1970 and 2,323 TWh in 1995. Between 1965 and 1990, nuclear generation increased from 25.5 TWh to 2000 TWh, a factor of 78.

It’s easy to challenge those growth accomplishments as being possible because they started from a lower base than exists today. However, the stated goal of a quadrupling is much lower than previous achievements and it starts on the base of a stagnant, but capable industry and supply chain.

Unlike the situation in 1965 or 1970, we have a large, underused base of nuclear knowledgeable people who are working outside of the nuclear industry. As interest, investment and productive activity in the nuclear development sector increase, some of those skilled people will make a mid-career pivot back to their nuclear energy roots. They’ll  inject valuable experience from fast growing industries at a leadership level that matters. Anecdotally, we’re already seeing it happen.

In a number of other ways, the nuclear industry is more ready for a period of accelerating growth today than it was in 1965 or 1970.

We know more about how to build and operate productive, reliable plants and we know what it takes to achieve impressive safety records. We are still learning which of the redundant layers of safety systems, unique quality assurance programs and operational constraints are not needed or that need to be changed. 

We have almost immeasurably faster computational capabilities, and we have developed capable tools that enable precision engineering and manufacturing to be done at a more rapid pace. Computer advances in the past 50-60 years have enabled automated factory production, automated welding and operational monitoring systems that were not available during the first Atomic Age. Material science has made numerous improvements during the past 50 years; some of them have been carefully tested in high radiation environments and are now ready for expanding use.

Stagnation, But Not Disappearance

Those improvements have been emerging and available for decades, but regulatory requirements, the NRC’s institutional risk aversion and the industry’s ingrained fear of its omnipotent regulator have resulted in deep stagnation and an avoidance of innovation within the established nuclear industry. 

Since 1975, when it was created by splitting apart the Atomic Energy Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has, in the words of the EO titled Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission “tried to insulate Americans from the most remote risks without appropriate regard for the severe domestic and geopolitical costs of such risk aversion.”

That risk aversion has created a culture where “no” has traditionally been the default position and where any proposed change is considered to be guilty until proven innocent. Change, including building new plants, has thus been slow or nonexistent. Anecdotal evidence accumulated from numerous conversations conducted over decades of involvement indicates that talented nuclear trained people have often left the industry because they grew frustrated with stagnation and innovation avoidance. 

In another anecdotal bit of evidence, we know several couples where each partner was a career nuclear professional who discouraged their children from choosing nuclear career paths, even though the children were math and science wizzes with an interest in engineering.

One of the most incredible examples of stagnation in the established nuclear industry is the fact that there is exactly one reactor in the United States with a fully digital control and instrumentation system. That reactor, which completed its analog to digital conversion in 2019, is PUR-1 (Purdue University Reactor Number 1). 

Duke Energy completed the conversion of its three-unit Oconee Nuclear station to an almost fully digital instrumentation system in 2013, but the process was so painful that no other plant owner has made a similar investment choice in the succeeding dozen years.

Even though it’s been stagnant on many measures, the U.S. nuclear industry has been strong, capable and resilient. It’s a base on which to build a vastly more expansive enterprise. In important ways, the nuclear industry of today is similar to the computer industry when it was dominated by mainframe computers with IBM and a small BUNCH (Burroughs, UNIVAC, NCR, Control Data and Honeywell) of smaller competitors. 

Imagine the world that could result if nuclear tech comes remotely close to copying the trajectory of the semiconductor tech sector.

Compelling Culture Change

The Executive Order aimed at reforming the NRC acknowledged how the ADVANCE Act of 2024 – which was enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support – sought to change the NRC’s risk averse culture. It required that the agency’s mission shall include “facilitating nuclear power while ensuring reactor safety.” That revised mission statement was issued January 28, 2025.

The EO takes the next step in the process of changing the agency’s culture by identifying the fundamental cause of the agency’s plodding, quadruple-checking, expensive approach to review and approval.

NRC utilizes safety models that posit there is no safe threshold of radiation exposure and that harm is directly proportional to the amount of exposure.  Those models lack sound scientific basis and produce irrational results, such as requiring that nuclear plants protect against radiation below naturally occurring levels.  A myopic policy of minimizing even trivial risks ignores the reality that substitute forms of energy production also carry risk, such as pollution with potentially deleterious health effects.

To address this problem, the EO directs the agency to “Adopt science-based radiation limits.” While that paragraph uses the seemingly mushy direction “NRC shall reconsider reliance on the linear no-threshold (LNT) model for radiation exposure,” it’s worthwhile to look to the EO Restoring Gold Standard Science for clearer understanding of what it means to “adopt science-based” regulations. 

The LNT construct cannot withstand even a cursory application of the directions in the Gold Standard Science EO. We may delve more deeply into this topic in a later post, but for now we will say that it seems unlikely that the LNT and the associated ALARA policy will remain unchanged.

The EOs plus previously enacted laws direct continuing effort to change NRC – and industry – culture away from one focused on driving risks from using nuclear energy and radioactive materials as close to zero as possible. The desired result is an agency that recognizes that “It is the policy of the United States to expedite and promote to the fullest possible extent the production and operation of nuclear energy to provide affordable, reliable, safe, and secure energy to the American people”.

The EO directing the reform of the NRC imposes a deadline of 18 months for a final decision on an application to construct or operate a new reactor and just one year for the final decision on an application to continue operating and existing reactor. It’s intriguing to note the language used; the Commission has often taken many months after the staff has issued a final safety evaluation to make a “final decision” on a license or permit.

These deadlines address the temporal variability that has often plagued nuclear energy project and technology development. Firm timelines – with some provision for extensions – help alleviate investor reluctance.

Successfully Attracting Investors

Investors have shied away from nuclear energy for a number of reasons, but one of the primary discouraging factors has been the uncertainty associated with the regulatory permitting process. That uncertainty does not stop after a Standard Design Approval, a design certification or even a combined license has been issued; history has proven that regulatory uncertainty plays an enormous role throughout the reactor construction and final testing processes.

Investors avoid uncertainty whenever possible. Even in financial segments like venture capital where there are inevitably high risks and great uncertainty, successful investors work hard to comprehensively understand and eliminate apparent risks before moving their money into an enterprise.

The collection of Executive Orders issued May 23 points to an action item list that will gradually reduce uncertainty and encourage investment. Perhaps most importantly, they make it clear that the policy of the United States is to support and expeditiously increase nuclear energy production for a host of important reasons including energy security, national security, electricity abundance, enhanced domestic manufacturing and protection from “pollution with potentially deleterious health effects.”

Though stock market price trends are the result of a collection of factors, they can provide useful indications of investor reactions to major events or policy statements. A sample of publicly traded companies with significant exposure to nuclear energy growth prospects provides a glimpse of investor sentiment during the brief period since the issuance of the EOs. 

For early stage growth companies facing major capital expenditures, strong market performance is a key fundraising tool. All three of the publicly traded advanced nuclear/SMR companies have recently announced stock sales that will build their cash on hand balances without adding debt. According to a recent Financial Times headline, the total recent capital raise among the three companies is in excess of $1 B.

From this admittedly early snapshot, the Executive Orders appear to be accomplishing their intent. They have enabled productive action, and they have stimulated the movement of significant investment dollars. They prove that words, both spoken and written, from the bully pulpit can stimulate action and provide important financial resources even without appropriating additional taxpayer dollars.