Motivating natural gas pipeline construction into New England
RBN Energy is one of my favorite sources of education about US energy markets. They publish a daily, song title-themed blog that focuses on a particular energy-related topic and provides useful analysis with a light, often humorous touch. That’s not easy to do when writing about a topic that is as controversial and impactful as energy.
RBN’s May 18 post was titled Please Come To Boston—New England’s Ongoing Gas-Supply Dilemma.
It introduces/promotes a new report produced by the consultants at RBN with the same title as the blog post. That report discusses a topic that has been covered here in some detail – the spiky behavior of natural gas prices in New England.
RBN Energy’s primary recommended solution is building more pipeline capacity into New England. That will enable abundant and affordable natural gas from the Marcellus shale formation to flow more easily into the region.
As much as I appreciate the energy education I’m getting from RBN, I’ve noticed that their preferred method of dealing with the nuclear energy aspect of the market is to ignore it. The ‘N’ word is conspicuously missing from the blog post about New England’s energy supply and it only appears three times in the detailed report.
Here is an example quote where one would have thought that nuclear energy would receive at least a mention.
Mitigation Efforts. Fear that wintertime gas supply shortfalls could leave the region woefully short of generating capacity prompted ISO New England, the electric grid operator, to implement a Winter Reliability Program (WRP) that in its latest iteration (for the winter of 2014-15) provided incentives to gas-fired power plants to stockpile LNG and dual-fuel power plants (ones that can burn either gas or oil) to stockpile oil that could be used to run their plants if gas was not available. ISO New England also is putting in place “pay-for-performance” requirements that will incent generators to line up firm gas supply to meet their winter needs. Are these solutions or just stopgaps?
Competitors to Gas. No energy source operates in a market vacuum. While natural gas has emerged as the go-to power plant fuel in New England, regional powers-that-be are exploring alternatives to going all-in on gas, such as building more wind and solar capacity and ramping up imports of Canadian hydropower. If the most ambitious of these plans were to pan out, future demand for gas would sag, and so would the need for incremental pipeline capacity.
The detailed report takes it as a given that nuclear power is as unpopular as coal in New England and the rest of the northeast. It assumes that the remaining plants will eventually shut down without any potential for replacement. That result would probably please most of RBN’s subscriber base, which the publisher describes as 18,000 + energy execs every day who are making connections “across energy markets – oil, NGLs, Gas.”
One of my self-assigned duties is to remind energy market participants that nuclear energy exists as both an option and as a potential competitor. I’m confident enough in its inherent capabilities that some of the good, well-resourced, and competitive people who populate the industry will break out from the pack and begin seriously thinking about making investments in developing those capabilities.
I’ve sort of given up hope that nuclear industry lifers will be the source of the kind of dynamic thinking and business model development that is required to build a true Renaissance based on the technological advantages provided by an energy dense fuel that produces reliable heat with exceedingly compact waste products that can be safely stored as long as needed.
Here is a comment that I left on RBN’s blog post.
While discussing natural gas price variations in New England, you overlooked the effect that the region’s antinuclear activism has had on the market.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, New England had a hugely volatile energy market dependent on imported oil, coal, and some natural gas. A logical response was to build a substantial nuclear energy capacity in the region.
Starting in the early 1970s, New England – and New York – became a major battleground over nuclear energy development. The Clamshell Alliance and other groups worked hard to halt nuclear energy expansion and then to shut down the capacity that had actually been completed and was operating.
Seabrook was delayed by half a dozen years and Unit 2 was never completed. Shoreham (820 MWe) was completed but never allowed to enter commercial operation. Indian Point 1 (275 MWe), Millstone 1 (660 MWe), Yankee Rowe (185 MWe), Maine Yankee (900 MWe) and now Vermont Yankee (620 MWe) have all been shutdown well before their mechanical end of lives. There is enormous pressure from the activists all the way up to the Governor of New York to shut down Indian Point 2 and 3. Pilgrim is under severe pressure as well.
Ginna (610 MWe) and Fitzpatrick (838 MWe) are both on the list of plants that are threatened by economics – mostly due to the availability of “cheap gas.”
A rough thumb rule is that each 1,000 MWe of nuclear plant capacity that is shut down or not built adds 0.2 BCF/day of natural gas demand.
Is it possible that natural gas interests are quietly – or actively – cheering the actions of the antinuclear activists in order to soak up some of their excess production from fracking the Marcellus formation?
Is it possible that some of them want to firm up their pricing power?
Rod Adams
Publisher, Atomic Insights
As of the time I’m publishing this post, may comment had not been moderated and made available to other readers, but when/if it is, I will provide an update.
Note: In addition to its perceptive analysis, I like RBN Energy because they have an unusual business model compared to many other consulting groups focused on the energy market.
They seek scale by providing value to a large number of customers at an affordable price. All of their in-depth reports are available to people that purchase a “Backstage Pass”, which is available for just $75.00 per month. That might sound like an expensive subscription to some people, but industry insiders that are used to paying several thousand dollars for detailed reports should find it cheap to purchase a pass for a month or so of detailed study.
I finally broke down and purchased my pass this morning. While respecting all copyrights, I’ll still be able to share some of what I learn from these oil and gas industry experts.
In keeping with RBN’s music themed approach, here is an inspirational tune explaining my interest in their information services.
Rod – glad you’re back online
Oops – meant to say a bit more: 18000 subscribers at $75 a month is a nice little enterprise if those numbers are to be believed….just a general comment on you jumping into the fray on RBN’s comments section:
Is there value in emphasizing public opinion data more? Does RBN understand that a majority of Americans support nuclear power? Have they been hoodwinked by a minority opinion because it is so vocal, so well-organized, and so entrenched (and funded) that the perception about where the axis of the debate lies gets completely distorted?
Looking at some April Gallup numbers, Americans don’t really like gas much more than nuclear, and they are very concerned about fracking-sourced pollution. Add to that the polls still consistently show Americans just aren’t that motivated on climate change, and you see that gas is almost a default choice…. Although there is broad support for developing wind and solar – but it’s almost as if that support is more about ‘American innovation’ and ‘energy independence’ and pollution concerns more than it is about limiting co2 emissions. When America catches up on climate change, and simultaneously realizes renewables have only a bit part to play in the solution…gas might suddenly look very vulnerable.
The RBN authors’ posts emphasize vary well natural gas developers’ pressing need to find new markets for their mounting projected surpluses which cannot be stored in significant quantity; so they live in constant fear of market collapse conditions like they experienced with oversupplies in 2012. They see an urgent need to find a market for ~3 billion cf/d of added summer surplus supplies from the Marcellus alone in the Mid-Atlantic & New England region. According to your rule of thumb estimate some 15GW(e) of generation capacity would need to be displaced. This is far more than New England’s nuclear capacity (now down to ~2.5GW) which supplies ~25% of the ISO-NEs annual demand.
Although their preferred solution is to burn it (see RBN post “This Gas is Made for Burning”) for electricity generation, VY shut down (annual output greater than Hoover Dam) and Brayton Point (old coal with a vary newly installed cooling tower) is set to shut down, Dominion is also proposing to convert its MD Cove Point LNG (import) Terminal into an export terminal with cryo-trains capable of 0.75 billion cf/d liquefaction capacity.
Natural gas exports should not only be encouraged to Europe & E Asia — (projected export capacity by 2020 is ~6 billion cf/d, additional national project proposals could double that by 2025 taking away ~1/6 of US natural gas production) — as a means of seriously hampering the Russian economy, but also the US automotive transport sector should be incentivized to manufacture dual-fuel capable CNG NGVs; ultimately the quantities of natural gas production that is estimated could completely displace all OPEC imports.
Energy experts like to emphasize the need for diverse energy supplies, policy planners should make it plain now that gas cannot displace all of coal by itself (coal+gas 70% of US electricity). Beyond 2030, once all coal burning power plants are likely phased out, the fission “quark spread” would moderate fears of gas price spikes (and history demonstrates gas prices are as spikey/volatile as petroleum) and overreliance on only one fossil fuel.
Pipeline capacity is constrained and so expensive that it made sense in the Boston area for (then) Commonwealth Gas to build and operate a gas liquefaction storage plant in Hopkinton Massachusetts. During the summer, when pipeline use rates were low, the plant liquified natural gas then stored it for evaporation when needed during peak winter demand.
Decades ago I did some utility consulting. Originally the storage was in underground rock caverns, thought to be leakproof because of the coldness froze water in the ground. A park ranger seeing bubbles in a nearby lake complained that they were natural gas. Skeptical gas company executives changed their minds quickly when the Smoky-hat ranger showed them two mass spectrographs comparing the composition of the bubbles and the gas suppled to homes. Storage was changed to above-ground tanks.
Rod
Glad to see you back on line!
Pay for Performance is a murky area of the electricity markets, somewhere between a “capacity payment” and pay for actual electric generation.
As I see it, however, pay-for-performance incentives are likely to be favorable for nuclear plants. The idea of pay-for-performance is that if a plant bids into the capacity market, gets a capacity payment, but then, when the plant is summoned to be on-line by the dispatcher, the plant says: “oh dear, so sorry….Can’t get on-line right now”… that plant will then have to pay a penalty.
Basically, with pay-for-performance, a plant which receives a capacity payment is therefore expected to provide power when called upon. If it does not provide power, it has to pay a penalty. Meanwhile, plants that do provide power get a bonus. So the penalties for not-performing basically get transferred as a reward to those plants that DO provide performance.
The whole thing is hard to understand, and I am not at all sure I have it completely correct, but I have it at least partially correct.
Of course, the plant that says: “so sorry, can’t come on-line” is more likely to be a gas-fired plant that can’t get gas. That plant will pay a penalty. The plant that says: “Sure, I’m here for you” is more likely to be nuclear plant. That plant will get a performance payment.
Here’s a link to the ISO-NE order:
http://www.iso-ne.com/regulatory/ferc/orders/2014/may/er14-1050-000_5-30-14_pay_for_performance_order.pdf
Note: FCM is Forward Capacity Market
A quote from the order: ISO said (page 3 of above), without the Pay for Performance:
According to ISO-NE, the current FCM design contains a flawed incentive structure that perpetuates fleet-wide resource performance problems and, as a result, is now failing to ensure reliability in a cost-effective manner.6 ISO-NE argues that capacity resources rarely face financial consequences for failing to perform……ISO-NE proposes to address these problems by linking capacity revenues to resource performance during reserve deficiencies.