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Atomic Insights

Atomic energy technology, politics, and perceptions from a nuclear energy insider who served as a US nuclear submarine engineer officer

Fuel Recycling

Radioactive isotopes are too useful to waste

July 10, 2019 By Rod Adams 32 Comments

Forgive me. It’s been almost three months since I last wrote a long form blog or article about the importance of atomic energy as a useful tool for solving many of the world’s most complex and pressing problems.

I’ve been stimulated to take a partial break from my blissful state of being a mostly retired grandfather whose primary responsibility is teaching more than a handful of young cuties how to swim, bike, boat, poop, pee and paddle.

If you’re happy to hear from me, thank Allison MacFarlane, Sharon Squassoni and The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists for jointly publishing an article that made me want to scream. Since our summer visitors and my dear wife are sound asleep after yet another day of fun in the sun, I made the prudent decision to react more quietly.

The stimulating article’s headline, Recycle everything, America—except your nuclear waste was seemingly designed as personally focused click bait. Throughout my hobby and career stages as an atomic energy writer and commentator, I have been writing about the importance of applying one of the wisest mantras of responsible environmentalism to radioactive materials – Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle.

It’s almost always irresponsible to casually use any material once and then treat it in a way that makes it difficult or impossible for that material to perform any other function or serve anyone else’s needs. It’s especially irresponsible and wasteful to use rare materials with special physical properties in that selfish and careless manner.

It’s a fact that has been gradually forgotten – or perhaps purposefully submerged – over time, but radioactivity is a rare and incredibly useful property.

Its discovery was so fascinating that it dominated the field of physics for several generations. Radium, one of nature’s more intense but also long lasting sources of radioactive emanations (to use a common term from the early days) became the world’s most valuable material. In 1930 a gram of radium would cost a customer (manufacturer, hospital, university or research institution) $250,000. That’s nominal, not inflation adjusted 1930s era dollars.

Radium didn’t command such a lofty price just because it was rare and difficult to isolate. It was valuable because it could perform important functions that no other material could perform. Its price was also supported by the fact that radioactivity, the natural property that gave radium its superpowers, wasn’t easy for humans to recreate or mimic.

Madam Curie would be disappointed

Fast forward 90 years. Humans unlocked atomic nuclei and learned to create an abundant array of radioactive materials with diverse and useful properties. We even figured out how to produce an almost limitless supply of raw power in a way that produces an almost limitless supply of isotopes whose best and highest use may be discovered in the distant future.

Unfortunately, there were many special interest groups and individuals whose wealth and power were threatened by the possibility of continuously improved ways of putting that raw power to beneficial use. Unfortunately for the prospects of rapid uptake of actinide energy, humans unlocked atomic nuclei while in a Hydrocarbon Era.

Our modern economy rests on a hydrocarbon foundation. Either directly or indirectly, hydrocarbons provide 80-90% of the power that humans have used and continue to use to shape the world. The corporations and individuals involved in the process of supplying those materials have no real interest in being supplanted by materials whose characteristics are so vastly different from the ones they are set up to find, extract, refine, transport, finance and govern.

So instead of embracing the opportunities that abundant energy and controllable quantities of radioactive materials could provide, the established interests fought off their budding competition.

One of the tactics they’ve used in their long, ongoing battle to protect their markets is fear of radioactive materials and their emanations.

They’ve created the perception that spontaneous heat and energy production is a terrible characteristic that makes radioactive materials into challenging waste disposal burdens. They stubbornly insist that the waste issue must be solved, and also stubbornly seek to slow or halt any effort that is progress without being a Final Solution.

Radioactive waste isn’t a solvable problem

There is no solution to radioactive waste, any more than there is a solution to feces production. Managing wastes is an ongoing enterprise that includes numerous steps, processes, equipment and inventions. It should be addressed with the same philosophies that have helped mitigate the costs and impacts of other sources of wastes.

We don’t manage feces production by starving people or animals or by preventing or eliminating their existence. Both integrated petroleum companies and meat packers have historically addressed stubborn waste problems by using science and ingenuity to turn byproducts of their processes into new products.

Gasoline was a waste stream during the early days of Standard Oil – it was burned off after the production of the more immediately valuable kerosene. The internal combustion engine came just in time – or perhaps it was designed in part to take advantage of a low-cost, readily available source of material.

As pork consumption increased, hog producers encountered growing waste challenges that stimulated producers to find ways to “Use everything but the squeal.”

Even natural gas, the highly valued source of fuel for cleaner electricity and home heating has often been a dangerous waste produced in association with producing a more valued product. Even today, there are far too many places where methane (aka natural gas) must be wastefully burned (flared) to prevent it from accumulating in explosive, difficult to handle quantities.

None of these examples, solve waste production issues. Instead, they mitigate them and produce streams of income that enable responsible research and development aimed at continued improvements in efficiency and material reuse.

Ownership is a key ingredient

A common element of that stimulates efficient waste reduction and material reuse in other industries has been, perhaps purposely, withheld from the nuclear industry.

In industries where operational guidance of “reduce, reuse and recycle” has achieved the greatest influence and success for both the environment and the economy, participants own the “waste.” Regulators provide oversight and legislators establish the rules, but the participants devise, implement and manage solutions.

But rendering isn’t just efficient; it’s also quite profitable — a $10 billion business. Smithfield, the world’s largest pork producer, is a $14 billion company, with $1 billion coming from rendering.

“Once you get to the processing stage, the manufacturers often own the product at that point. It’s certainly in their interest to use every little bit of it that they can,” says Dana Gunders of the Natural Resources Defense Council, who studies food waste.

From NPR Sep 29, 2014 “Everything But The Squeal: How The Hog Industry Cuts Food Waste”

For the nuclear industry, this approach has worked for certain waste streams, but the one that is the most troublesome and has gotten the most attention as something that isn’t being solved is treated uniquely.

Nuclear power plant operators do not own used nuclear fuel (historically and legally called “spent nuclear fuel”). Neither can any other private entity. It cannot be legally sold and it cannot be separated into useful, purified compounds or elements.

Instead, the federal government long ago established a tightly controlled monopoly on ownership. By law, the government forced power plant operators to sign contracts that require them to allow the government to pick up and take title to all used fuel. They cannot sell the material and they cannot separate and reuse any of the components of the material.

This declared monopoly is the cause of what has often appeared to be unseemly corporate behavior, especially for people whose philosophy tends toward free market principles. They – logically enough – cannot understand why nuclear plant operators band together to demand that the government solve the spent nuclear fuel problem.

Power plant operators are working hard to convince a contractor (the federal government in this case) to fulfill its contractural obligations. The courts have generally agreed and have held the government liable to pay the additional monetary costs that have been incurred as a result of its failure to deliver its contracted service.

But even people who strongly support nuclear science and agree that nuclear fission is a terrific way to safely produce electricity without air pollution believe that the “unsolved” waste issue is a solid reason to slow or stop waste production until it can be solved.

Incentives are all wrong or non existent

Though history has proven that safe handling and storage of used nuclear fuel can be turned into a rather routine industrial activity, there is a continuing stalemate that looks and sounds like an immovable obstacle.

“The waste issue” has become one of the strongest weapons in the arsenal of arguments used by people that either don’t understand nuclear energy or who fear that allowing it to succeed or fail on its own merits might pose an existential threat to their wealth, power or employment.

The people assigned to government agencies that have legally assigned responsibilities for removing fuel cannot be held accountable for failures caused by lack of appropriate resources.

Legislators are often told about the huge savings account that has accumulated over decades of accessing fees to pay the government for its promised (and required) service of taking possession and title for used fuel.

But current budget rules allow them to use that spreadsheet cell as an offset that makes the federal budget deficit look a little smaller. There is no actual lockbox that prevents the money from being used for other purposes.

Study after study has been done to show that recycling used fuel would be uneconomical, but those studies always assume that the government will own resulting material and be required to sell only certain parts while disposing of the rest it under current paradigms.

No government employed individual or team has the kind of incentive to market material or devise processes that are remotely similar to those available in private industry.

Don’t expect final solutions. Allow progress, innovation and creativity

The nuclear waste issue will never go away. It’s not fundamentally different from any other waste issue that is a permanent part of all productive processes, both natural and man-made.

It is an issue, however, that can be addressed and handled with ever improving steps, processes and equipment. The most straightforward way to enable the issue to shrink into a routine part of a valuable industrial activity is to make modest changes in the rules that make the government the owner of the material.

It’s the government’s job to provide oversight. It should establish and enforce rules that provide a reasonable assurance of adequate protection, but it should allow multiple entities the freedom to devise useful parts of a functional enterprise.

Like all other successfully handled – but never solved – waste challenges, the used nuclear fuel enterprise should be governed by the principles of reduce, reuse and recycle.

Filed Under: Fuel Recycling, isotopes, Nuclear Waste

Time to Re-examine Alternatives for Plutonium Disposition – Dr. Peter Lyons explains why dilute and dispose is wasteful and unworkable

February 24, 2018 By Guest Author 31 Comments

By Peter Lyons

Somewhere in Russia, 34 tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium—enough material to make about 10,000 weapons—are awaiting disposal. Moscow was supposed to start destroying this stockpile, but has yet to start, leaving a huge threat lurking in an unknown location. If even a tiny fraction of this material fell into terrorists’ hands, they could threaten nuclear terrorism around the world.

Yet, the plutonium’s continued existence isn’t Russia’s fault. It’s ours.

In 1998, Russia and the United States agreed to each dispose of 34 tons of surplus plutonium, a major step towards nuclear nonproliferation. But in the years since, due to mistaken policy decisions, the U.S. hasn’t begun destroying its own stockpile—and that process isn’t going to start anytime soon. In turn, Russia hasn’t complied either while they wait for us, leading to the current stalemate.

The good news is that Russia still intends to uphold the deal—but only if the U.S. finds a credible way to dispose of its plutonium. On the current path, that may never happen. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have adopted a technique to dispose of our plutonium stockpile that Russia has already rejected, deeming it not credible.

Luckily, there is a third path, one that would provide significant economic benefits to the U.S. economy and one that Russia has already approved, ensuring that Moscow would finally dispose of its 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium. It’s time for the Trump administration to abandon the failed Obama-era approach and chart a new course, one that can comply with the deal signed 20 years ago.

I have decades of experience with this issue: I was science adviser to the late Sen. Pete Domenici, who authored the original legislation codifying the 1998 U.S.-Russia agreement, and then served as a commissioner on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Under Barack Obama, I served as the Energy Department’s top nuclear energy official.

Under the original agreement, the United States agreed to dispose of its plutonium by building a facility to make mixed plutonium-uranium reactor fuel—known as MOX fuel—to use in our commercial reactors. At the time, this path made sense since we anticipated a “nuclear energy renaissance,” which promised a growing need for reactor fuel.

But in the past two decades, the MOX proposal has become much less likely to work. First, that “nuclear energy renaissance” never happened. In fact, reactors are closing in many countries and there is so much cheap uranium that some of the world’s most productive mines have closed. Second, the facility to convert the plutonium into MOX fuel—originally scheduled to start operating in 2016—is years behind schedule and well over-budget; its current completion date is at least a decade away. And even if the fuel facility is completed, domestic utilities are not interested in burning MOX fuel in their reactors because uranium is so cheap—unless the government pays them. In other words, for the MOX proposal to work, the government would have to pay to build and maintain the facility—and then pay utilities to actually burn the MOX fuel. Not a great business model!

Hoping to break this political and financial logjam, the Obama administration devised a new approach to get rid of its plutonium called “dilute and dispose.” Under this approach, the plutonium is blended with other waste and sent to a radioactive waste disposal facility, the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) in New Mexico. “Dilute and dispose” renders a valuable resource totally worthless, but the Obama administration supported this option because it was cheaper than the MOX approach.

However, like the MOX proposal, this approach is unlikely to work. The biggest problem is that the WIPP doesn’t even have the capacity to complete its present mission and also dispose of the 34 tons of plutonium. Any new use of WIPP could crowd out other uses, potentially delaying the disposal of waste generated in the clean-up of former defense facilities. In addition, even if there was enough room, WIPP is not currently licensed to accept this additional material. Even worse, Russia already rejected this idea, both in the original negotiations and again last year, because it does not destroy the plutonium. In other words, even if the Trump administration successfully implemented the “dilute and dispose” option, Moscow likely wouldn’t dispose of its own 34 tons of plutonium.

Luckily, there’s another option. During the Obama administration, I argued vehemently that the “dilute and dispose” proposal was a poor choice and instead recommended to dispose of the plutonium as fuel in fast reactors, which effectively destroy the plutonium. I was overruled, but this idea remains the best chance to eliminate Russia’s dangerous stockpile of plutonium and realize other important national benefits.

Fast reactors are not new in the United States. Back in the 1950s, we built several fast reactors and demonstrated their impressive safety attributes, including proving that they could not melt down even with a complete loss of coolant. But through a combination of early safety issues and political decisions, the last fast reactor in the country shut down in 1993.

However, several U.S. companies—including Terrapower, which is funded by Bill Gates, General Atomics and General Electric—are exploring fast reactors because of their versatility and melt-down proof operation; among other abilities, they can destroy nuclear waste, burn plutonium, and generate electricity with higher efficiency than existing reactors. But the exploration process can take years, especially since any testing requires the use of existing Russian fast reactors. But if Washington financed a fast reactor to dispose of its plutonium stockpile, it would jumpstart the development process by providing a fast reactor testing platform in this country, a real benefit to many U.S. companies. Congress has recognized this opportunity as well, earmarking money in fiscal 2016 to develop a plan for an advanced reactor, such as a fast reactor.

Such a plan would also prevent the U.S. from falling behind on modern technologies as other nations, including France, Japan, China, and India consider building their own fast reactors. At the very least, this proposal would ensure that the U.S. has enough operational experience with fast reactors to participate in global discussions on their safety and nonproliferation characteristics.

This plan has one downside: It would be more expensive than the “dilute and dispose” option since we’d have to build a new reactor. But unlike Obama’s plan, the fast reactor proposal would ensure that Russia disposes of its plutonium stockpile. In fact, Moscow intends to use its own fast reactors to destroy its plutonium. If we adopt a similar proposal, we would satisfy the original agreement, taking an important step towards nuclear nonproliferation and a safer world.

Peter Lyons worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1969 until he became science advisor to Sen. Pete Domenici from 1997 to 2005. He was a Commissioner on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from 2005 to 2009 and Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy from 2011 to 2015. He now consults on nuclear energy and safety issues.


The above fist appeared on Politico on February 7, 2018. It is republished here with permission.

Filed Under: Atomic politics, Fuel Recycling

Commercial supplies of HALEU needed to enable advanced reactors

May 15, 2017 By Rod Adams

Jake DeWitte and Caroline Cochran, the cofounders of Oklo, a start up company that is developing a 1-2 MWe nuclear reactor-based power system for remote areas, have been credited with drawing attention to a problem that can be solved by a government policy decision. “Nearly all advanced reactors have a need for low enriched fuel […]

Filed Under: Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Advanced Atomic Technologies, Fuel Comparisons, Fuel Recycling, Nuclear Waste

U.S. Shouldn’t Depend On Russian Reactors. Restore Our World Class Fast Flux Test Facility

March 10, 2017 By Rod Adams

Senator Carper (D-DE) asked each witness at a March 8 hearing about NEIMA – Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act – to give one suggestion for improving the bill. If asked, my answer would be to include findings that emphasize the importance of U.S. government-owned testing facilities that are capable of supporting the NRC licensing […]

Filed Under: Advanced Atomic Technologies, FFTF, Fuel Recycling, Irradiation, Liquid Metal Cooled Reactors

Potential for Korea, Japan, U.S. to Collaborate on Pyroprocessing Under Trump

February 18, 2017 By Rod Adams

South Korea (ROK), Japan and the United States all have large nuclear energy programs that are facing a variety of challenges limiting their growth, namely opposition by the nonproliferation industry to wider deployment of enrichment and recycling technologies. There is interest and opportunity to collaborate in developing solutions in areas where challenges overlap. The Global […]

Filed Under: Advanced Atomic Technologies, Atomic politics, Fuel Recycling, International nuclear

Jimmy Carter never served on a nuclear submarine. Was not a nuclear engineer

January 13, 2017 By Rod Adams

Initial version posted Jan 27, 2006 A recent conversation about the dangers of false claims of expertise stimulated me to revise and republish a nearly 11 year-old post. It provides documented proof that Jimmy Carter was not a “nuclear engineer” and never served on a nuclear submarine. He left the Navy in October 1953, about […]

Filed Under: Fuel Recycling

Passive-Aggressive Fight Against Plutonium Economy

October 12, 2016 By Rod Adams 36 Comments

Late on a Friday afternoon (September 23), the Department of Energy released an updated performance report on the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF). DOE’s internal Office of Project Management Oversight and Assessment in partnership with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers produced the report using assumptions and data provided by DOE leadership. The report concludes […]

Filed Under: Atomic politics, Fuel Recycling, Plutonium, Politics of Nuclear Energy

How Did the MOX Project Get So Expensive?

May 17, 2016 By Rod Adams 23 Comments

Over the past week or so, I’ve engaged in a “root cause analysis” project to determine why the US is having so much difficulty implementing a plan to take 34 metric tons of nearly pure plutonium 239 — a fissile isotope with virtually the same energy value as uranium 235 — out of our nuclear […]

Filed Under: Atomic politics, Breeder Reactors, Economics, Fossil fuel competition, Fuel Recycling, Politics of Nuclear Energy

Atomic Show #245 – Building a prosperity program on used nuclear fuel foundation

October 8, 2015 By Rod Adams 9 Comments

I applaud reasoned, long term thinking that aims to use science, technology and deep understanding of human wants and needs — aka politics — to set a course for success. You can find one of my favorite current examples of an effort that meets my criteria in the expansive, lightly populated, rather dry state of […]

Filed Under: Advanced Atomic Technologies, Atomic Entrepreneurs, Atomic politics, Business of atomic energy, Fuel Recycling, International nuclear, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Nuclear Waste, Podcast, Politics of Nuclear Energy

Sad-ending story of EBR-II told by three of its pioneers

August 24, 2015 By Rod Adams

During the period between 1961 and 1994, an extraordinary machine called the Experimental Breeder Reactor 2 (EBR-II) was created and operated in the high desert of Idaho by a team of dedicated, determined, and distinguished people. In 1986, that machine demonstrated that it could protect itself in the event of a complete loss of flow […]

Filed Under: Advanced Atomic Technologies, Atomic history, Atomic Pioneers, Atomic politics, Breeder Reactors, Fuel Recycling, Liquid Metal Cooled Reactors, Politics of Nuclear Energy, Pro Nuclear Video, Technical History Stories

Contradicting Arjun Makhijani’s claim about bombs from power reactors

March 21, 2015 By Rod Adams

On March 3, 2015, Arjun Makhijani testified in front of a committee of the Minnesota Senate. The committee was conducting an investigation on whether or not it should recommend lifting the state’s current moratorium on building new nuclear reactors. Here is the presentation that he prepared and delivered. During his recorded testimony, Makhijani falsely stated […]

Filed Under: Antinuclear activist, Fuel Recycling, Nuclear Communications, Nuclear Waste

South Australian senator believes there’s value in “nuclear waste”

March 18, 2015 By Rod Adams

South Australian Sen. Sean Edwards sees economic opportunity for his state by taking advantage of other countries’ irrational fear of radioactive materials. He wants to turn what some call “waste” into wealth. He and his staff recognize that there are tens of billions of dollars set aside in government budgets around the world for safe […]

Filed Under: Fuel Recycling, International nuclear, Nuclear Waste, Politics of Nuclear Energy

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