April 25, 2013

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We write to underscore the importance of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, and to caution against the adoption of policies that could inadvertently weaken the ability of the United States to continue to provide international leadership on this critically important issue.

For more than half a century, the cornerstone of global efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation has been the “atoms for peace” formula. With very few exceptions, the countries of the world have accepted this formula. Countries that enter into it commit not to pursue nuclear weapons, and in exchange are guaranteed support for their right to develop civil nuclear power and other peaceful uses of atomic energy, and submit to international supervision.

The Atoms for Peace formula has been very successful. Access to commercial nuclear technology was not seen as a threat to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but rather as a sign of the health of that regime and an essential means for implementing it. One of our nation’s most powerful tools for guaranteeing that the countries acquiring this technology continue to use it exclusively for peaceful purposes is to ensure that the U.S. commercial nuclear industry continues to play a leading role in the international civil nuclear marketplace. Here the news is not encouraging.

While the United States and one or two other countries had a near-monopoly on civil nuclear technology in the 1950s, today the list of countries actively competing in the international civil nuclear marketplace includes Russia, France, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan and South Korea. And it is likely soon that China and India will become active participants in the international nuclear marketplace. According to a November 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on nuclear commerce, the U.S. share of global exports of “nuclear reactors, major components and equipment, and minor reactor parts” fell from 11 percent to just 7 percent between 1994 and 2008. The U.S. share of global exports of nuclear fuel fell from 29 percent to just 10 percent over that same period of time.

This decline in U.S. market share translates to substantially diminished U.S. influence in such areas as nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear safety. As a result, the United States is in an increasingly weak position to unilaterally impose onerous requirements on potential buyers of civil nuclear technology, simply because buyers have so many alternatives to U.S. sources of supply. It follows that, in order to restore its nonproliferation influence around the globe, the United States Government must find ways to strengthen the competitiveness of the U.S. nuclear industry, and avoid policies that threaten to further weaken it.

We therefore urge that, as part of your export control reform initiative, streamlining of the process for licensing civil nuclear exports be made a top priority. We know that there are experts who
argue that we should make access to American nuclear technology even more restrictive in the future. This would have the unintended effect of further diminishing America’s competitiveness in the global nuclear marketplace. America’s ability to lead the global nuclear nonproliferation regime will diminish steadily as America abandons the field.

Consistent with the Atoms for Peace policy framework, America restricts the right of other countries to buy from American nuclear suppliers unless those countries agreed to stringent security procedures and conditions (the so-called 123 process). Historically we have managed this process on a sensible case-by-case basis. If we adopt a much more restrictive approach, we will not prevent countries from acquiring nuclear technology, but instead will encourage nations to turn to suppliers that do not impose difficult standards. The non-proliferation regime is weakened in that circumstance.

We share your Administration’s concern about the risks associated with the potential spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies such as enrichment and reprocessing. But as our nation seeks to reduce these risks, we must be careful not to diminish America’s influence in the international civil nuclear marketplace. America’s nuclear industry exports are shrinking, and this is bad for non-proliferation policy.

The U.S. Government must recognize that the U.S. civil nuclear industry is one of its most powerful tools for advancing its nuclear nonproliferation agenda. It is critical to adopt policies that will strengthen that tool. Weakening it will merely cede foreign markets to other suppliers less concerned about nonproliferation than the United States.

Sincerely,

Senator William S. Cohen
Former Secretary of Defense

Dr. James Schlesinger
Former Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense and Director, CIA

Admiral Michael Mullen
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Dr. John Hamre
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense

General Brent Scowcroft
Former National Security Adviser

General James Jones
Former National Security Adviser

Senator Pete Domenici
Former Chairman Senate Budget Committee

Ms. Susan Eisenhower
Chairman Emeritus, Eisenhower Institute